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IN SU R A N C E  —  TH IRD PARTY —  R EIN SU R A N C E —  STATUTORY  
INTERPRETATIO N.
The question of the right created by section 211 (1) of the New 
Brunswick Insurance Act1 was raised again in the recently decided 
case of New Zealand Insurance Company v. Cyr.3 As a result of 
a motor vehicle accident, the respondent Cyr had recovered judg­
ment against Grondin, the insured named in a motor vehicle 
liability policy issued by the United Scottish Insurance Company 
Limited and in force at the time of the accident. Between the date 
of the accident and the date of entering judgment, the United 
Scottish decided to terminate its Canadian business. To this end 
it entered into an agreement of reinsurance with the appellant 
company which provided, in part, that the latter company, for 
consideration, would . . assume all the duties in connection 
with and the liabilities of the ‘UNITED SCOTTISH’ for all losses 
and other obligations arising out of Insurance Policies and Certifi­
cates on risks in Canada that are Outstanding and Unsettled. . .
His judgment against Grondin remaining unsettled, Cyr brought 
action against the New Zealand Insurance Company, seeking 
recovery under section 211(1) of the Insurance Act and the agree­
ment between the two Insurance Companies.
At the trial it was held that as a result of the judgment 
entered against Grondin, and the operation of the statute, a 
liability had been imposed on the United Scottish Insurance Com­
pany, and that this liability was transferred to the New Zealand 
Insurance Company by their agreement to reinsure.4 This decision 
was reversed in the Appeal Division of the Supreme Court of New 
Brunswick on the basis that no privity of contract could be estab­
lished between the parties. In delivering the unanimous decision 
of the Court, McNair, C.J.N.B., quoted from Halsbury:
As a general rule a contract affects only the parties to it, and can­
not be enforced by or against a person who is not a party, even if
1 R.S.N.B., 1952, c. 113, s. 2 1 1 (1 ):
Any person having a claim against an insured, for which indem­
nity is provided by a motor vehicle liability policy, shall, n o tw ith ­
standing that such person is not a party to the contract, be entitled, 
upon recovering a judgment therefor against the insured, to have the 
insurance money payable under the policy applied in or towards 
satisfaction o f his judgment and o f any other judgments or claims 
against the insured covered by the indemnity and may, on behalf of 
him self and all persons having such judgments or claims, maintain an 
action against the insurer to have the insurance money so applied.
2 (1 9 6 4 ), 49 M.P.R. 298.
3 Ibid., at p. 299.
4 [1962] I.L.R. 1-080.
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the contract is made for his benefit and purports to give him the 
right to sue or to make him liable upon it.5
The interpretation of section 211(1), and of the identical 
provisions in the Insurance Acts of the other common law prov­
inces,“ has been the subject of considerable litigation. The question 
which has repeatedly arisen is the nature of the right bestowed by 
the statute upon a third party judgment creditor of the insured. 
Is the third party given the right to sue the insurer upon the terms 
of the contract of insurance, or is he given a statutory right to sue 
the insurer independent of the terms of the contract? It is clear 
that McNair, C.J.N.B., based his decision on the former point of 
view. In addition to the passage from Halsbury, his judgment 
quoted with approval the following words of Harrison, J., in the 
Appeal Division of the Supreme Court of New Brunswick in 
Bourgeois et al. v. Prudential Assurance Co. Ltd.:
The principal question here is whether the action is based 
upon the contract contained in the policy or upon an entirely 
independent statutory liability imposed on insurance companies.
. . .  in my opinion, sec. 183 gives a third party a right to sue 
upon the insurance contract, if any; . . .7
The statutory provision8 referred to by Harrison, J. is identical to 
section 211 of the present Insurance Act of New Brunswick.
The majority decision of the Supreme Court of Canada in 
Northern Assurance Co. Ltd. v. Brown9 departed from the deci­
sion in the Bourgeois case, however. In that case the respondent 
was struck and injured by a car owned by Schnurr, and driven 
with his consent by Corbett. One ground of appeal was that a 
statutory provision of the policy required that any action under 
the policy be commenced within one year from the date the cause 
of action arose. The respondent brought his action more than 
a year after the accident and it became necessary for the Court to 
decide whether the right of action under the statute was inde­
pendent of the insurance contract. The majority of the Court held 
that the right of action arising under section 214 of the Ontario 
Insurance Act10 did not depend in any way upon the contract of
5 Halsbury’s Laws of England, 3rd ed., vol. 8. p. 66.
6 R.S.A., 1955, c. 159, s. 302; R.S.B.C., 1960. c. 197, s. 242: R.S.M., 
1954, c. 126, s. 227; R.S.N., 1952, c. 96, s. 26; R.S.N.S., 1954, c. 18, 
s. 26; R.S.O., 1960, c. 190, s. 223; R.S.P.E.I., 1951, c. 77, s. 200; 
R.S.S., 1953, c. 133, s. 251.
7 (1 9 4 5 ), 18 M.P R. 334, at pp. 341-2.
8 The Insurance Act, 1937. 1 Geo. VI, c. 44, s. 183( 1).
9 [1956] S.C.R. 658.
10 R.S.O., 1950, c. 183, s. 214(1).
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insurance. Kerwin, C.J., with the concurrence of Taschereau, J., 
stated:
. . .  I am of opinion that condition 9 (3 )  does not apply to the 
claim o f the respondent. That claim is a substantive right given 
by statute and does not arise under the contract.11
Locke, J., stated the same opinion in the following words:
I do not consider that the cause o f action vested in the respond­
ent was a right to sue upon the insurance contract issued by the 
appellant to Schnurr.12
Further on there was approval of the dissenting opinion of Baxter, 
C.J., in the Bourgeois case:
In the Prudential Assurance Company case above referred to, 
Baxter, C J . dissented from the judgment o f the majority o f the 
court, his opinion being that the limitation section did not apply, 
for substantially the same reasons as those which commended  
themselves to the Court o f Appeal in the present matter. I 
respectfully agree with these learned judges and would dismiss this 
appeal with costs.15
Rand, J., also gave reasons for holding the right of action 
afforded by the section to be non-contractual. Despite a strong 
dissenting opinion by Cartwright, J., therefore, the answer to the 
question raised above was clearly settled by the Supreme Court 
of Canada: a third party’s right of action against the insurer under 
section 211 of the Insurance Act is not upon the provisions of the 
insurance contract, but arises solely out of the statute.
The question in the New Zealand case therefore should have 
been: Have the statutory requirements giving rise to a right of 
action in the third party been satisfied? These requirements are 
quite clear:
(1) The claimant must have a claim against an insured for 
which indemnity is provided by a motor vehicle liability 
policy.
(2) He must have a judgment therefore against an insured.
(3) He must bring his action against the insurer.
Clearly the respondent Cyr was able to fulfil the first two 
requirements of the statute. He had a claim against an insured for 
which indemnity was provided by the policy issued by the United 
Scottish Insurance Company and he had a judgment therefor. To 
succeed in his action against the New Zealand Insurance Company,
11 [1956] S.C.R. 658, at p. 660.
12 Ibid., at p. 663.
13 Ibid., at p. 667.
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however, he would have to show that that company was an insurer 
for the purposes of section 211(1) of the Insurance Act.
Section 211(1) seems to suggest that before an insurance 
company can properly be deemed to be an “insurer” it must have 
undertaken or effected a contract of insurance entitling the insured 
to indemnification. The operation of the section would seem to 
demand the existence of a relationship between the judgment 
debtor and the insurance company founded on either a contrac­
tual or a statutory right in the former to indemnity from the latter. 
This grounds the statutory right in the third party to sue the 
insurer.
It is difficult to say how far a court may go in interpreting 
the term “insurer”. In attempting to fit a reinsurer within the 
scope of “insurer” for the purposes of section 211(4) it may be 
useful to consider two cases in which the Supreme Court of 
Canada has given a broad interpretation to the term “insured” as 
it applies to the same section. In Northern Assurance Co. Ltd. v. 
Brown14 it was argued that the claim must fail since the third 
party claimant had recovered judgment not against Schnurr, the 
insured named in the policy, but against Corbett, who was driving 
the car with Schnurr’s consent. However the court was unanimous 
in holding that for the purposes of an action under the correspond­
ing section 214 of the Ontario Insurance Act, Corbett was an 
insured. Considerable assistance was offered by the definition in 
the statute:
‘insured’ means a person insured by a contract whether
numed or not.15
Thrt Corbett was actually insured by the contract, although not 
named, was unquestioned.
In Global General Insurance Company v. Finlay and Layng18 
the named insured died before the expiry date of the policy. It 
was unanimously held by the Supreme Court that the named 
insured’s executrix, and a person driving with her consent, should 
properly be considered to be “insured” under the policy. Cart­
wright, J., adopted the reasoning of Schroeder, J.A., in the court 
below,17 who had based his decision on the fact that the words of
14 [1956] S.C.R. 658.
15 R.S.O., 1950, c. 183, s. 1 9 2 (e ). A n identical provision is included in 
the N ew  Brunswick Insurance Act, R .S.N.B., 1952, c. 113, s. 191(d ).
16 [1961] S.C.R. 539.
17 (1 9 6 0 ), 23 D.L.R. (2d ) 376.
74 U.N.B. LAW  JOURNAL
the policy, read in the light of statutory conditions 1(a) and
(b) ( i) ,18 showed that the parties had contemplated that the named 
insured’s executors should succeed to the rights under the policy 
in the event of her death during the policy period.
In these cases, the Supreme Court was able to rely on 
statutory and contractual provisions as founding a relationship 
between the judgment debtor and the insurance company and thus 
to extend the meaning of “insured” beyond the parties named in 
the policies. Unfortunately, however, these interpretations of 
section 211(1) may not be found adaptable so as to bring a 
reinsurer within the scope of the term “insurer” due to the total 
absence of the necessary relationship between the insured and the 
reinsurer. No reliance may be placed on any statutory relation­
ship since the definition of “insurer”19 (Joes not seem to contem­
plate a reinsurer as the term is used in the NefrTealand case. Nor 
would a policy holder with one company appear to be in a con­
tractual relationship with a reinsurer when he is neither a party 
to the reinsurance contract nor an assignee of the benefit. A claim 
such as that by Cyr in the New Zealand case would therefore seem 
to fail for want of statutory assistance and for want of privity of 
contract between the insured and the reinsurer.
Fact situations identical to that encountered in New Zealand 
Insurance Company v. Cyr are not likely to arise frequently. They 
are, however, a predictable result of insurance companies reinsur­
ing their policies and leaving the jurisdiction. Moreover, in view 
of the decided cases and the interpretation placed upon the statute 
they leave a third party judgment creditor in the unfortunate posi­
tion of having to establish that the reinsurer is to be considered 
the insurer for the purposes of section 211(1). His only alterna­
tive is the expensive process of securing judgment against the 
original insurer, and then attempting to have this judgment 
enforced in a jurisdiction in which the original insurer has assets.
There is no doubt that justice demands a quick and effective 
method of providing recovery against the reinsurer in these cases. 
The reinsurer has undertaken an obligation of a commercial nature
18 R.S.O., 1950, c. 183, s. 197. Statutory Condition 1 (a ), ( b ) ( i ) .  An 
identical provision is included in the N ew  Brunswick Insurance Act, 
R.S.N.B., 1952, c. 113, s. 196, Statutory Condition 1 (a ), ( b ) ( i ) .
19 R.S.N.B., 1952, c. 113, s. 1 (3 2 ):
“insurer” includes any corporation or any society or association incor­
porated or unincorporated, any fraternal society or any person or 
partnership, or any underwriter or group o f underwriters, that under­
takes or effects, or agrees or offers to undertake or effect, a contract 
o f insurance;
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and has received a consideration which it agreed was adequate to 
cover the risk. The legislature could avert this type of injustice 
by amending the Insurance Act to provide that for purposes of an 
action of this type a reinsuring company shall be deemed to be 
an insurer.
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